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I. Introduction  
Imagine Mr. Johnson, a New Jersey resident, upon the birth of his child, properly 
executed an advance directive with the requisite capacity. His advance directive unequivocally 
states that if he enters into a vegetative state, he wants to be kept alive via any available life-
sustaining medical treatment, in hope that he may recover to continue caring for his child. 
Johnson named his wife, Mrs. Johnson, as his health care representative. Thirty years later, 
assume Johnson develops a persistent and pronounced cough. His now adult child convinces 
Johnson to visit his doctor. The doctor examines Johnson’s lungs, discovers that he has Stage IV 
lung cancer, and explains to him that he has only four-six months to live. Wrought with the fear 
of suffering, Johnson returns home and explains his prognosis to his family. He also explains that 
he does not want to suffer as the end of his life draws near. One week later, Johnson attempts 
suicide, but fails. Johnson suffers severe mental and physical damage as a result of his suicide 
attempt, and is now on life support. Without the life support, he will die. Further, he is only 
minimally aware of his surrounding environment. 
Should a doctor, in cases like Johnson’s, consider a terminally ill patient’s attempted 
suicide to be “an act evidencing an intent to revoke” his instructive directive,1 thereby allowing a 
health care representative to decide to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining medical treatment. 
This paper argues that a terminally ill patient’s attempted suicide may constitute an “act 
evidencing an intent to revoke”2 an instructive directive if the attending physician3, or a court, 
                                                 
1 N.J.S.A. 26:2H-57(b)(1). 
2 Id. 
 2 
concludes by clear and convincing evidence,4 that the declarant had the necessary mental 
capacity to achieve revocation. If the attending physician finds that the terminally ill patient was 
competent at the moment of revocation, his decision to revoke his instructive directive by 
attempted suicide was protected by his fundamental right to make health care decisions.5  
Physicians are bound by specific ethical criteria that may conflict with a patient’s 
fundamental right to make health care decisions.6 Given the extreme nature of revoking an 
instructive directive by attempted suicide, one can expect a physician or hospital to not recognize 
the revocation. However, honoring a terminally ill patient’s advance directive requesting life-
sustaining medical treatment after a suicide attempt fails to respect the patient’s fundamental 
right to make health care decisions. Such a conflict would likely be resolved through the 
judiciary. Thus, this paper details the framework Courts should employ to resolve this conflict, 
and offers suggestions to the Legislature on how to keep this conflict from judicial review.   
Part II defines advance directives and summarizes the relevant provision of the New 
Jersey Advance Directives for Health Care Act (“the Act”). Part III discusses suicide’s or an 
attempted suicide’s potential rationality. Part IV analyzes whether suicide or an attempted 
suicide can evidence intent. Part V evaluates whether a declarant can be considered competent 
                                                                                                                                                             
3 N.J.S.A. 26:2H-60(a). 
4 See Matter of M.R., 135 N.J. 155, 169 (1994) (holding that the challenger of incapacity bears 
“the burden of proving incapacity by clear and convincing evidence.”).  
5 See Matter of Farrell 108 N.J. 335, 347-8 (1987) (“While we held that a patient's right to refuse 
medical treatment even at the risk of personal injury or death is primarily protected by the 
common law, we recognized that it is also protected by the federal and state constitutional right 
of privacy.”); Matter of Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 346-8 (1985) (holding that the right to make 
decision regarding one’s body is protected at common law and by the federal constitutional right 
of privacy); N.J.S.A. 26:2H-54(a) (“Adults have the fundamental right, in collaboration with 
their health care providers, to control decisions about their own health care unless they lack the 
mental capacity to do so.”). 
6 Farrell, 108 N.J. at, 351(“Even as patient’s enjoy control over their medical treatment, health 
care professionals remain bound to act in consonance with specific ethical criteria. We realize 
that these criteria may conflict with some concepts of self-determination.”). 
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after revoking an advance directive by attempted suicide. Part VI discusses whether a court 
should allow a patient to achieve revocation of his advance directive via a suicide attempt. Part 
VII offers recommendations to the Legislature to avoid having the Judiciary address this issue. 
Part VIII concludes this paper. 
II. Advance Directives: Generally and in New Jersey 
In the New Jersey Advance Directives for Health Care Act, the New Jersey Legislature 
declared that “adults have the fundamental right. . .to control decisions about their own health 
care unless they lack the mental capacity to do so.”7 Furthermore, the Legislature “recognizes the 
inherent dignity and value of human life and within this context recognizes the fundamental right 
of individuals to make health care decisions to have life-prolonging medical or surgical means or 
procedures provided, withheld, or withdrawn.”8 The Legislature also “recognizes the right of 
adults, who have the mental capacity, to plan ahead for health care decisions through the 
execution of an advance directive . . .and to have wishes expressed therein respected, subject to 
limitations.”9 
An advance directive is “a document that takes effect upon one’s incompetency and 
designates a surrogate decision-maker for healthcare matters. . .The agent must make decisions 
in accordance with the principal’s relevant instructions, if there are any, in in the principal’s best 
interest.”10 A declarant is “an adult who has the mental capacity to execute an advance directive 
and does so.”11 “An advance directive may include a proxy directive or an instructive directive, 
                                                 
7 N.J.S.A. 26:2H-54(a). 
8 N.J.S.A. 26:2H-54(b). 
9 N.J.S.A. 26:2H-54(c). 
10 BLACK LAW DICTIONARY 60 (9th ed. 2009). 
11 N.J.S.A. 26:2H-55. 
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or both.”12 A proxy directive is “a writing which designates a health care representative in the 
event the declarant subsequently lacks decision making capacity.”13 A health care representative 
is an “individual designated to make health care decisions on the principal’s behalf in the event 
of the principal’s incapacitation.”14 An instructive directive is “a writing which provides 
instructions and direction regarding the declarant's wishes for health care in the event that the 
declarant subsequently lacks decision making capacity.”15 
Pursuant to the Act and any applicable advance directive, “[l]ife sustaining treatment may 
be withheld or withdrawn from a patient. . .when a patient is in a terminal condition, as 
determined by the attending physician and confirmed by a second qualified physician.”16 A 
terminal condition is defined as  
the terminal stage of an irreversibly fatal illness, disease, or condition. A 
determination of a specific life expectancy is not required as a precondition for a 
diagnosis of a ‘terminal condition,’ but a prognosis of a life expectancy of six 
months or less, with or without the provision of life-sustaining treatment, based 
upon reasonable medical certainty, shall be deemed to constitute a terminal 
condition.17  
 
Notably, the Act allows a declarant to revoke or modify his advance directive, “including 
a proxy directive, or an instructive directive, or both.”18 Thus, an advance directive is a flexible 
document capable of changing should an unexpected circumstance arise.19 In New Jersey, a 
declarant can revoke an advance directive by: (1) an oral or written notification to a heath care 
                                                 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
16 N.J.S.A. 26:2H-67(a)(3). 
17 N.J.S.A. 26:2H-55. 
18 N.J.S.A. 26:2H-57(b). 
19 Peter C. Harman, Note, ‘Locked-In’ to Their Decisions: Investigating How the States Govern 
Revocation of Advance Directives and How Three States Make Revocation Impossible for People 
with Locked-In Syndrome, 3 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 193, 194 (2011). 
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representative, physician, nurse, health care professional, or other reliable witness; (2) execution 
of a subsequent advance directive; or (3) “any other act evidencing an intent to revoke the 
document.”20 “[R]evocation. . .of an advance directive is effective upon communication to any 
person capable of transmitting the information including the health care representative, the 
attending physician, nurse, or other health care professional responsible for he patient’s care.” 21  
“The attending physician shall determine whether the patient lacks capacity to make a 
particular health care decision,”22 such as a revocation of an instructive directive.  
A determination that a patient lacks decision making capacity shall be based 
upon, but need not be limited to evaluation of the patient’s ability to understand 
and appreciate the nature and consequences of a particular health care decision, 
including the benefits and risks of, and alternatives to, the proposed health care, 
and to reach an informed decision.23  
 
This capacity test shall hereinafter be referred to as the Act’s capacity test. “The 
attending physician’s determination of a lack of decision making capacity shall be confirmed by 
one or more physician . . .[unless] the patient’s lack of decision making capacity is clearly 
apparent.”24  “If the attending physician has determined that a terminally ill individual has 
capacity to make informed major medical decisions on his or her own behalf, the individual shall 
make decisions regarding. . .the withholding or withdrawing of LSMT”25 (life-sustaining medical 
treatment). Logically, if the attending physician concludes that a terminally ill patient has 
capacity, the patient may also make the decision to revoke his instructive directive by any “act 
                                                 
20 N.J.S.A. 26-2H-57(b)(1)-(2). 
21 N.J.S.A. 26-2H-57(e). 
22 N.J.S.A. 26:2H-60(a). 
23 N.J.S.A. 26:2H-60(g). 
24 N.J.S.A. 26:2H-60(b). 
25 N.J.A.C. 10:48B-51. 
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evidencing an intent to revoke,”26 consistent with the Act and his fundamental right to make 
health care decisions.27  
In the above hypothetical, Johnson’s decision to revoke his instructive directive by 
attempted suicide is tantamount to a decision to withhold or withdraw life sustaining medical 
treatment. Both decisions constitute a heath care decision that ultimately results in the declarant’s 
death.  
Furthermore, a decision to withhold or withdraw life sustaining medical treatment is 
frequently made by a health care representative on the declarant’s behalf due to the declarant’s 
incapacitation. Here, although Johnson’s decision to revoke his instructive directive was made 
while Johnson was competent, his decision left him incapacitated. His failed suicide attempt 
caused mental and physical damage and necessitates life sustaining medical treatment. Mrs. 
Johnson, as Johnson’s heath care representative, could withhold or withdraw his life sustaining 
medical treatment, but only if his instructive directive is considered revoked. Life sustaining 
medical treatment could be withheld or withdrawn because Johnson’s Stage IV lung cancer 
constitutes a terminal condition under the Act.28 Johnson’s physician projected his life 
expectancy to be limited to four-six months as a result of his Stage IV lung cancer. Assuming a 
second physician would give the same diagnosis,29 Johnson’s cancer constitutes a terminal 
condition. Therefore, Mrs. Johnson could withhold or withdraw his life sustaining medical 
treatment, so long as his instructive directive is revoked.  
Below is an analysis of the New Jersey doctrine regarding whether a terminally ill patient 
may revoke his advance directive by attempted suicide.  
                                                 
26 N.J.S.A. 26-2H-57(b)(1). 
27 See Farrell 108 N.J. at 347-8; Conroy, 98 N.J. at 346-8l N.J.S.A. 26:2H-54(a). 
28 N.J.S.A. 26:2H-55. 
29 N.J.S.A. 26:2H-67(a)(3). 
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III. Can suicide or a suicide attempt be considered a rational and well-reasoned act? 
 
Courts have recognized suicide, or a suicide attempt, to be a rational and well-reasoned 
act.30 Suicide’s potential rationality has been primarily discussed within the context of 
determining testamentary capacity. In In re Rein’s Will, the testator was found unconscious due 
to gas inhalation, and subsequently revived seven and half months before drafting his will.31 The 
will’s objectors claimed the gas incident was a suicide attempt, and demonstrated that the testator 
lacked testamentary capacity.32 The Prerogative Court of New Jersey held that there was no 
evidence that the gas incident was a suicide attempt and thus it did not prove testamentary 
incapacity.33 However, the Court also noted “suicide or attempted suicide is not in and of itself 
proof of mental incapacity to make a will or proof of general insanity.”34 Furthermore, the Court 
stated that suicide can often be a rational recourse for an individual who carefully considers his 
“particular problem” and determines that a life of suffering – caused by that problem – is not 
worth living.35 Moreover the Court noted that there are countless examples in literature and 
reality “where persons of superior intellectual force and reasoning power have deliberately 
chosen self-destruction as the solution to what appears to them to be an insufferable difficulty.”36 
Similarly, in In re Laurenson’s Estate, the Prerogative Court of New Jersey held that the 
testator’s suicide attempt actually evidenced her testamentary capacity.37 There, the testator 
                                                 
30 In re Rein’s Will, 50 A.2d 380, 384 (N.J. Prerog Ct. 1946), In re Laurenson’s Estate, 165 A. 
584, 584-5 (N.J. Prerog. Ct. 1933). 
31 Rein’s Will, 50 A.2d at 384. 
32 Id. at 383. 
33 Id. at 384. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. at 384-5. 
37 Laurenson’s Estate, 165 A. at 584-5. 
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“suffered from a kidney disorder and hardening of the arteries.”38 Her condition deteriorated over 
the course of several years.39 At one point, the testator committed a failed suicide attempt after 
executing a will.40 The Court held that her suicide attempt took “grit.”41 Further, the Court held 
that her suicide attempt constituted powerful, albeit misdirected, evidence of mental stamina and 
testamentary capacity.42 
Likewise, the Court of Appeals of New York considered the potential rationality behind 
an act of suicide. In Roche v Nason, the testator committed suicide two days after executing a 
codicil to his will.43 Objectors to the will claimed that if the will and codicil were executed with 
the intent to commit suicide thereafter, the instruments should be void as against public policy.44 
Although the Court held that there was no evidence indicating that either the will or codicil were 
executed with the intent to commit suicide, the Court stated that a testamentary instrument would 
not be void even if it was executed in contemplation of suicide.45 Additionally, the Court held a 
suicidal act does not evidence testamentary incapacity, and noted “human experience has often 
shown that sane men have taken their own lives.”46 Furthermore, the Court stated, “insanity is 
not inferable from the mere act of suicide.”47 
Although these principles stem from nearly century-old cases, their persuasive value is 
not diminished by their age. In actuality, the courts have long ago settled suicide’s potential 
rationality. The rule may be summarized as follows: A suicide or suicide attempt can be 
                                                 
38 Id. at 584. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 585. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 Roche v. Nason, 77 N.E. 1007, 1007-8 (N.Y. 1906). 
44 Id. at 1008. 
45 Id. at 1009. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
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considered rational and sane when the individual chooses suicide as a solution to a particular 
problem, after carefully considering a life dominated by the suffering caused by that problem. 
In the instant hypothetical, Johnson attempted suicide to avoid a life of suffering caused 
by terminal lung cancer. In fact, Johnson told his wife that he did not want suffer as the end of 
his life drew near. Further, Johnson’s decision to commit suicide occurred after receiving a fatal 
prognosis of having a four-six month life expectancy from his physician, and after discussing his 
prognosis with his wife and child. Moreover, Johnson undoubtedly contemplated suicide and its 
ramifications in the week between his diagnosis and his a suicide attempt. These facts indicate 
that Johnson’s suicide attempt was a rationally and thoughtful recourse chosen to avoid any 
suffering in his final months of life.   
IV. Can the act of suicide or attempted suicide constitute  an act evidencing an intent to 
revoke an advance directive? 
 
A suicide or an attempted suicide can constitute an act evidencing an intent to revoke an 
advance directive. As previously stated, a declarant may revoke an advance directive by an “act 
evidencing an intent to revoke the document.”48  Precedent for holding that a suicidal act can 
evidence an intent to revoke an advance directive is found in two case: Laurenson’s Estate and 
State v. Mann. In Laureson’s Estate, as mentioned above, the Prerogative Court of New Jersey 
held that the testator’s suicide attempt actually evidenced her testamentary capacity.49  
A suicidal act’s evidentiary power is more frequently considered within the context of 
proving a criminal defendant’s guilt. In State v. Jaggers, the Court of Errors and Appeals first 
established the principle in New Jersey that a criminal defendant’s attempted suicide while in 
                                                 
48 N.J.S.A. 26-2H-57(b)(1). 
49 Laurenson’s Estate, 165 A. at 584-5. 
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custody is admissible as evidences of guilt.50 The principle was more recently reaffirmed in State 
v. Mann.51 “In admitting such evidence, courts often have relied on the traditional view that a 
defendant may attempt suicide because of an inability to endure the prospect of prosecution and 
punishment. Alternatively, attempted suicide has been regarded as evidence of a consciousness 
of guilt.”52 
Thus there is precedent for the general principle that a suicidal act may be considered as 
evidence of intent. The act of suicide, or an attempted suicide, is not devoid of meaning merely 
because society generally considers it to be reprehensible.53 In fact, suicide can quite clearly and 
definitively evidence a victim’s intent. Suicide can demonstrate testamentary capacity or intent, 
and guilt. Likewise, a suicide or an attempted suicide can constitute an act evidencing an intent 
to revoke an advance directive, within the meaning of the Act.     
V. Can a terminally ill declarant who attempted suicide be considered competent after 
the event to be permitted to revoke his advance directive? 
 
A. Determining a patient’s competency to make medical decisions. 
Having determined that suicide or an attempted suicide can be both a rational act and an 
act evidencing an intent to revoke, one must determine whether a terminally ill declarant who 
attempted suicide can be considered competent after the event to be permitted to revoke his 
advance directive, even if that suicide attempt caused incapacitation. It is important to first 
consider what the New Jersey Legislature wrote about determining a patient’s competency to 
make medical decisions.  
                                                 
50 State v. Jagger, 58 A. 1014, 1014 (N.J. 1904). 
51 State v. Mann, 132 N.J. 410, 421 (1993) (“Like evidence of flight, evidence of a defendant’s 
suicide attempt that follows the alleged commission of an offense is generally admitted.”).  
52 Id. 
53 See Roche, 77 N.E. at 1009 (holding that execution of a testamentary instrument with the 
intent to commit suicide –however reprehensible – cannot invalidate a testamentary disposition 
of property). 
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A determination that a patient lacks decision making capacity shall be based 
upon, but need not be limited to evaluation of the patient’s ability to understand 
and appreciate the nature and consequences of a particular health care decision, 
including the benefits and risks of, and alternatives to, the proposed health care, 
and to reach an informed decision.54  
 
New Jersey courts have also provided guidance on the matter. In Matter of Schiller, the 
Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, first delineated a test New Jersey court should 
use to determine whether a patient has the mental capacity to consent to medical treatment.55 A 
patient has the capacity to consent when the patient has “sufficient mind to reasonably 
understand the condition, the nature and effect of the proposed treatment, attendant risks in 
pursuing the treatment, and not pursuing the treatment.”56   
The Supreme Court of New Jersey adopted this capacity-to-consent test in Matter of 
Conroy.57 In that case, the Court considered whether a feeding tube could be removed from Ms. 
Conroy (“Conroy”), an incompetent and institutionalized elderly woman.58The Court held that 
life-sustaining medical treatment may be withdrawn or withheld by a healthcare representative 
“if there is sufficient proof to satisfy the subjective, limited-objective, or pure-objective test,”59 
hereinafter referred to collectively as the substitute decision making tests. A healthcare 
representative may not employ these substitute-decision making tests “unless the patient has 
been proven incompetent to make the particular medical treatment decision at issue.”60 In so 
                                                 
54 N.J.S.A. 26:2H-60(g). 
55 Matter of Schiller, 148 N.J. Super. 168, 180-1 (Ch. Div. 1977). 
56 Id. 
57 Conroy, 98 N.J. at 382-3.  
58 Id. at 335. 
59 Id. at 374. See also Id. at 361, 365-6, 366 (explaining the subjective, limited-objective, and 
pure-objective tests, which are to be used by a healthcare representative or other surrogate 
decision maker to determine whether an incompetent patient would want life sustaining medical 
treatment to be withdrawn or withheld).  
60 Conroy, 98 N.J. at 381. 
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holding, the Court adopted the capacity-to-consent test enunciated in Schiller.61 Furthermore, the 
Court stated “a patient may be incompetent because he lacks the ability to understand the 
information conveyed, to evaluate the options, or to communicate a decision.”62 Additionally, the 
Court stated that “the inability to ‘govern’ one’s self and manage one’s other affairs does not 
necessarily preclude the ability to make a decision to forego further medical treatment.”63 
Moreover, a patient’s capacity, or incapacity, must be proven by clear and convincing 
evidence.64 
It is important to note that Schiller’s capacity-to-consent test mimics the language of the 
doctrine of informed consent. The Conroy Court noted this relationship, and used the doctrine of 
informed consent to expand upon the Court’s definition of a patient’s competency to refuse 
medical treatment. “The doctrine of informed consent presupposed that the patient has the 
information necessary to evaluate the risks and benefits of all available options and is competent 
to do so.”65 
Thus, the Court held that a patient’s right to refuse medical treatment was a logical 
corollary to the right to give informed consent.66 Indeed, a “patient’s ability to control his bodily 
                                                 
61 Id. at 382-3, citing Schiller, 148 N.J. Super. at 180-81. 
62 Conroy, 98 N.J. at 382. 
63 Id. at 383. 
64 Id. at 382. 
65 Id. at 347. quoting Wanzer, Adelstein, Crnaford, Federman, ook, Moertel, Safar, Ston, Taussig 
& Van Eys, The Physician’s Responsibility Toward Hopelessly Ill Patients, 310 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 955, 957 (1984) (“There are three basic prerequisites for informed consent: the patient 
must have the capacity to reason and make judgments, the decision must be made voluntarily and 
without coercion, and the patient must have a clear understanding of the risk and benefits of the 
proposed treatment alternatives or nontreatment, along with full understanding of the nature of 
the disease and prognosis.”). 
66 Conroy, 98 N.J. at 347. 
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integrity through informed consent is significant only when one recognized that this right also 
encompasses a right to informed refusal.”67 
The Supreme Court of New Jersey reaffirmed the capacity-to-consent test when it 
reaffirmed the trial courts decision in Matter of Farrell. In that case, the issue presented was 
whether a competent, terminally ill adult patient living at home could withdraw a life-sustaining 
respirator.68 Kathleen Farrell was a competent, albeit terminally ill and paralyzed patient 
suffering from amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS).69 She wanted to be disconnected from the 
respirator that sustained her breathing in order to die.70 The trial court applied the Schiller’s 
capacity-to-consent test, and held that Farrell was competent to refuse life sustaining medical 
treatment.71 The Supreme Court of New Jersey affirmed the trial court’s decision.72 In so 
affirming, the Court restated its definition of patient competency. “A competent patient has a 
clear understanding of the nature of his or her illness and prognosis, and of the risks and the 
benefits of the proposed treatment, and has the capacity to reason and make judgments about the 
information.”73 Moreover, the Court noted that adults are presumed to be competent.74  
The Farrell Court’s definition of patient’s competency is effectively the same as 
Schiller’s capacity-to-consent test. Further, both the Farrell Court’s definition of competency 
and Schiller’s capacity-to-consent test are effectively the same as the Act’s capacity test. 
Thus, the doctrine of law regarding patients’ competency to make medical decisions is 
summarized as follows: 
                                                 
67 Id. 
68 Farrell, 108 N.J. at 344.  
69 Id. at 342, 345. 
70 Id. at 345. 
71 Farrell, 212 N.J. Super. 294, 299 (Ch. Div. 1986). 
72 Farrell, 108 N.J. at 359. 
73 Id. at 354 n.7, citing Conroy, 98 N.J. at 347, 
74 Farrell, 108 N.J. at 356. 
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A determination that a patient lacks decision making capacity shall be based 
upon, but need not be limited to evaluation of the patient’s ability to understand 
and appreciate the nature and consequences of a particular health care decision, 
including the benefits and risks of, and alternatives to, the proposed health care, 
and to reach an informed decision.75 
 
“A patient may be incompetent because he lacks the ability to understand the information 
conveyed, to evaluate the options, or to communicate a decision.”76 “[T]he inability to ‘govern’ 
one’s self and manage one’s other affairs does not necessarily preclude the ability to make a 
decision to forego further medical treatment.”77 A patient’s capacity, or incapacity, must be 
proven by clear and convincing evidence.78 
  The New Jersey cases analyzed in Sections B and C below are addressed pursuant to a 
variety of capacity tests. However, a conclusion under one capacity test can be considered to be 
the same conclusion that would be reached under any of the other tests.  
B. Cases in which patients were held to be competent to make medical decisions. 
There are cases in which courts have held a patient to be competent to make medical 
decisions. The most famous New Jersey case is Matter of Farrell. As previously stated, Kathleen 
Farrell was a competent, albeit terminally ill and completely paralyzed patient suffering from 
amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS).79 She was incapable of moving any part of her body, had 
difficulty swallowing and speaking, was incapable of eating solid foods, was incontinent as to 
bowel, and had bladder difficulties.80 The disease did not cause any mental impairment.81  
                                                 
75 N.J.S.A. 26:2H-60(g). 
76 Conroy, 98 N.J. at 382. 
77 Id. at 383. 
78 Id. at 382. 
79 Farrell, 108 N.J. at 342, 345. 
80 Farrel, 212 N.J. Super at 296-7, aff’d 108 N.J. at 359. 
81 Id. at 344. 
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Farrell wanted to be disconnected from the respirator that sustained her breathing in order 
to die.82 She discussed her decision to terminate her life sustaining medical treatment with her 
husband Mr. Farrell, her teenage children, her physician, two psychologists, her parents, and her 
sister.83 Subsequently, Farrell’s husband commenced an action to be appointed as his wife 
Special Medical Guardian “with the specific authority to disconnect her respirator.”84 The trial 
court appointed a guardian ad litem for the children. 85 
The trial court first considered whether Farrell was competent to decide to withhold life 
sustaining medical treatment.86 The trial court employed Schiller’s capacity-to-consent test.87 At 
trial, Farrell testified that her decision to end her life sustaining medical treatment was motivated 
by a desire to end her suffering.88 A Board-certified psychologist, who examined Farrell at the 
request of the children’s’ guardian ad litem, “testified that she was competent to make the 
decision.”89 Similarly, after evaluating Farrell, her psychologist concluded, “Farrell made an 
informed, voluntary, and competent decision to remove the respirator.” 90  
Based on the totality of the evidence, the trial court concluded that Farrell clearly 
understood “the nature of her condition and that death is almost certain to occur as a result of the 
disease if the respirator is removed.”91 Further, the trial court stated that Farrell was “totally 
aware of her surroundings and is able to understand and communicate her will and wishes to 
                                                 
82 Id. at 345. 
83 Id. at 345-6. 
84 Id.  
85 Id. 
86 Farrell, 212 N.J. Super at 299, aff’d 108 N.J. at 359. 
87 Id. 
88 Farrell, 108 N.J. at 346. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. at 345. 
91 Farrell, 212 N.J. Super at 299, aff’d 108 N.J. at 359. 
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other people.”92 Thus, Farrell was held to be competent.93 The Supreme Court of New Jersey 
affirmed the trial court’s decision, holding “that a competent patient like Kathleen Farrell can 
choose to have her life-supporting treatment discontinued.”94  
Likewise, Payne v. Marion General Hospital provides an instructive example of a court 
holding a patient to be competent to make medical decisions.  Cloyde Payne, who was suffering 
from “malnutrition, uremia, hypertensive cardiovascular disease, chronic obstructive lung 
disease, non union of a previously fractured left humerus, and congenital levoscoliosis of the 
lumber spine,” was admitted to Marion General Hospital.95 Payne’s condition worsened over 
several days, and his lungs began filling up with mucus.96 Using a telephone, Payne’s doctor 
consulted with Payne’s attending nurses and Payne’s sister regarding his condition, and 
subsequently ordered a “no code.”97 “A ‘no code’ is a designation on a patient’s chart that no 
cardiopulmonary resuscitation is to be given in the event the patient begins to expire.”98 The 
doctor did not consult with Payne before issuing the “no code.” Payne died a few hours later.99 
“Occasionally, Payne was awake and alert, and he made eye contact with the nurses 
attending him. Payne was [also] conscious and capable of communicating with the nurses until 
moments before his death.”100 
Payne’s Estate sued the doctor and the Hospital, alleging that the doctor committed 
malpractice when he ordered the “no code.”101 The Court granted the doctor and hospital’s 
                                                 
92 Id. 
93 Id. 
94 Farrell, 108 N.J. at 359. 
95 Payne v. Marion General Hosp., 549 N.E.2d 1043, 1044 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990).  
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. at 1050. 
100 Id. at 1044. 
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motion for summary judgment and Payne’s Estate appealed.102 On appeal, the Estate argued that 
Payne was competent at the time the “no code” was ordered.103 Thus, the doctor should have 
obtained his informed consent before issuing the “no code.”104 The Court of Appeals of Indiana, 
Second Circuit ultimately reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment.105  
In evaluating the Estate’s claim, the Court examined the depositions of Payne’s attending 
nurses.106 The depositions revealed that Payne was “conscious, alert and able to communicate 
when the ‘no code’ was entered.”107 At first, Payne was capable of verbal responses.108 Further, 
his communication was responsive and the nurses were able care for him based upon his 
responses.109 Even when Payne lost the ability to communicate verbally, the nurses testified that 
he never lost his ability to communicate entirely.110 One nurse also testified that Payne was 
conscious and aware of his surroundings.111 That nurses also stated that Payne had the capacity 
to hear and understand what was being said to him.112 Therefore, the Court held that “Payne was 
competent when [the doctor] issued the ‘no code.’”113  
C. Cases where patients were held to be incompetent to make medical decisions. 
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Conversely, courts have held patients to be incompetent to make medical decisions. In In 
Re A.A., A.A. was involuntarily committed to a psychiatric hospital.114 She suffered from severe 
depression and hallucinations.115 A.A. named her daughter as her health care representative in 
her advance directive.116 The psychiatric hospital commenced the action, seeking to administer 
electro-convulsive therapy (“ECT”) to treat A.A., using the consent of her daughter.117  
The issue considered was “whether the living will executed by A.A., constituted 
sufficient authorization for the administration of ECT.”118 The Superior Court of New Jersey, 
Chancery Division, stated that a determination of A.A.’s incapacity must be made pursuant to the 
Act before A.A.’s advance directive can become operative.119 The Court considered A.A.’s 
capacity pursuant to the Act’s capacity test.120 As per the Act’s requirements, two psychiatrists 
submitted certifications stating that A.A. lacked capacity to make medical decisions.121 They 
stated that A.A. was severely depressed and suffered form psychotic symptoms.122 Additionally, 
one psychiatrist stated that A.A. did not believe any treatment would be a benefit.123 Moreover, 
both doctors stated that A.A.’s condition rendered her incapable of making medical decisions.124 
Finally, they both doctors stated that ECT was necessary treatment.125 The Court held this 
evidence sufficient to establish that A.A. lacked decision-making capacity, and that two 
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psychiatrists opinion’s satisfied the Act’s procedural requirement.126 Thus, the Court found 
A.A.’s advance directive to be operative, thereby allowing A.A.’s daughter to consent to ECT.127 
Similarly, the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, found a patient to lack 
decision-making capacity in Matter of Schiller. In that case, a hospital sought appointment of a 
special guardian for William’s Schiller’s to consent to the amputation of Schiller’s gangrenous 
leg.128 The hospital submitted affidavits from a surgeon stating that Schiller’s condition was life 
threatening, and from a psychiatrist stating that Schiller was mentally incapable of giving 
consent to the operation.129 
The Court determined Schiller’s decision-making capacity pursuant to the capacity-to-
consent test.130 Schiller testified that he “had no real problems before he came to hospital.”131 
However, the surgeon who was on duty the day Schiller was admitted stated that Schiller, upon 
admission to the hospital, was covered in his own excrement, disheveled, and had gangrenous 
foot.132 He opined that Schiller’s condition developed over months.133 Additionally, the surgeon 
stated that he talked to Schiller about his condition and explained the need to amputate his leg to 
prevent further infection, but Schiller was never able to decide to consent to the surgery.134  
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The psychiatrist stated that Schiller had organic brain damage and “that Schiller did not 
comprehend the amputation as a life-saving technique.”135 Moreover, the psychiatrist opined, 
“Schiller did not have the mental capacity to knowingly consent or refuse to consent.”136  
Finally Schiller testified, “he did not want the operation; he just wanted to be left alone 
and die; he wanted to continue to receive care, and if there were a place he could go and be taken 
care of, he was interested in living.”137 An attorney was eventually appointed.138 The attorney 
filed an Answer to the hospital’s Complaint, stating, “Schiller did not want the operation and did 
not consent.”139  
At trial, two psychiatrists “testified that Schiller was incapable of understanding his 
present condition, understanding the amputation as a life-saving technique, and either consenting 
to or refusing to consent to the amputation.”140 An independent psychiatrist also testified that 
Schiller suffered from brain damage, was disoriented as to time and place, did not understand 
who was talking to him, was unable to manage himself or his affairs, and could not do simple 
addition or subtraction.141 
Therefore, the Court found Schiller to lack decision-making capacity.142 The Court 
granted the hospital’s petition and appointed Schiller’s cousin as special guardian with the power 
to consent to the amputation.143     
D. Johnson was competent when revoking his instructive directive by attempted 
suicide. 
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Johnson was competent when revoking his instructive directive by attempted suicide. 
First, as an adult, Johnson is presumed to have been competent.144  Furthermore, suicide is 
nothing if not final. It is purposeful self-destruction. It is the ending of one’s life. Johnson’s 
cancer prognosis was terminal. He understood that he was going to die as a result of the cancer 
within four-six months of his diagnosis. Similarly, one can assume that Johnson understood and 
appreciated that his decision to commit suicide would also result in self-destruction. Thus, 
Johnson understood the nature and repercussions of his decision to revoke his instructive 
directive by attempted suicide.   
Moreover, Johnson’s decision to revoke his instructive directive by attempted suicide is 
akin to Farrell’s decision to terminate life-sustaining medical treatment. Farrell understood that 
disconnecting from her respirator would result in her death, and that her death would achieve her 
goal of ending her suffering.145 Likewise, Johnson understood the benefits of suicide. As 
previously stated, courts have recognized that a sane man can rationally chose to commit suicide 
in order to escape or avoid an “insufferable difficulty.”146 Johnson considered a life dominated 
by the pain and suffering of cancer to be an insufferable difficulty. In fact, he told his family that 
he did not want to suffer as the end of his life drew near. Furthermore, Johnson’s doctor properly 
informed him about his Stage IV lung cancer. Johnson was aware that he had no other life-saving 
treatment alternatives. Johnson knew that his cancer was terminal. Therefore, using his “superior 
intellectual force and reasoning power,”147 Johnson determined suicide to be best solution to 
avoid any suffering.  
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Additionally, Johnson never lacked the ability to understand his diagnosis and prognosis. 
Johnson never suffered from a mental illness or mental impairment. One can assume that he 
evaluated his options post diagnosis while discussing his illness with his family and during the 
week between his diagnosis and his attempted suicide. Further, as previously established, 
Johnson can communicate his decision to revoke his instructive directive via attempted 
suicide.148 Also, there is no evidence to indicate that Johnsons was unable to manage himself or 
his affairs prior to and the time of his cancer diagnosis. Thus, Johnson was competent when 
revoking his instructive directive by attempted suicide. 
VI. Should a court allow a declarant to achieve revocation of his advance directive via a 
suicide attempt? 
 
In Farrell, the Supreme Court of New Jersey established a procedure to be used when 
competent patients decide to withdraw with withhold life-sustaining medical treatment. 149 First, 
the patient must be “competent and properly informed about his or her prognosis, the alternative 
treatments available, and the risk involved in the withdrawal of the life sustaining treatment.”150 
Second, the patient’s choice must be made voluntarily and without coercion.151 Third, the 
patient’s decision to forgo life-sustaining medical treatment “must be balance against the four 
potentially countervailing state interests.”152 “Generally a competent informed patient’s ‘interest 
in freedom from nonconsensual invasion of her bodily integrity would outweigh any state 
interest.’”153 Furthermore, the Court required that two non attending physicians examine a 
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patient “to confirm that he or she is competent and is fully informed about his or her prognosis, 
the medical alternatives available, the risks involved, and the likely outcome.”154  
In Matter of Conroy, the Supreme Court of New Jersey described the four State interests 
that limit a competent patient’s right to decline life-sustaining medical treatment. The State 
interests are as follows: (1) preserving life; (2) preventing suicide; (3) safeguarding the integrity 
of the medical profession; and (4) protecting innocent third parties.155  
The State’s interest in preserving life was deemed to be the most significant, and 
encompassed the interest of preserving the patient’s life and the sanctity of all life.156 Moreover, 
the State’s interest in preventing suicide was subsumed in the States interest in preserving life.157 
However, the State’s interest in preserving life does not outweigh a competent patient’s right to 
self-determination when the decision to refuse medical treatment only affects the decision 
maker’s own life.158 This type of decision does not involve the actual or potential life of 
another.159 Thus, a competent patient has a “stronger personal interest in directing the course of 
his own life.”160 Indeed, “the value of life may be lessened rather than increased by the failure to 
allow a competent human being the right of choice.”161  
Similarly, a competent person’s choice to refuse life sustaining medical treatment does 
not constitute a suicide attempt, because the patient’s death would be the result of the underlying 
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disease rather than a self-inflicted injury.162 “Recognizing the right of a terminally ill person to 
reject medical treatment respects that person’s intent, not to die,” but to self-determination.163 
Furthermore, the State’s interest in safeguarding the integrity of the medical profession is 
not implicated by a competent patient’s refusal of life-sustaining medical treatment.164 When 
treating a competent patient, a doctor’s responsibility does not extend beyond advising the 
patient of the risks and urging the patient to accept treatment.165 After fully advising the 
competent patient, the patient is entitled to accept or reject treatment.166 “Indeed, if the patient’s 
right to informed consent is to have any meaning at all, it must be accorded respect even when it 
conflicts with the advice of the doctor or the values of the medical profession as a whole.”167 
Finally, the Court stated that a competent patient’s right to self-determination must give 
way if innocent third parties, such as the patient’s minor children, are directly and adversely 
affected by the patient decision to forgo life sustaining medical treatment.168 The Supreme Court 
of New Jersey reaffirmed these four State interests in Farrell.169 
The New Jersey Legislature later codified five State interests used to limit a competent 
patient’s fundamental right to make health care decisions, including: (1) preserving the patient’s 
life and the sanctity of all life; (2) preventing “purposeful self-destruction, motivated by a 
specific intent to die;” (3) protecting innocent third parties from harm; (4) safeguarding the 
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ethical integrity of the medical profession; and (5) protecting vulnerable patient’s from potential 
abuse and “facilitating the exercise of informed and voluntary patient choice.”170  
As previously stated, Johnson’s decision to revoke his advance directive by attempted 
suicide is tantamount to a decision to forgo life-sustaining medical treatment. Thus, Johnson’s 
decision should be analyzed pursuant to the Farrell framework. Under said framework, Johnson 
should be allowed to revoke his instructive directive via his attempted suicide. Johnson’s 
competency to revoke his instructive directive by attempted suicide was previously established 
supra page 20-22. Moreover, his act of revocation was voluntary and without coercion. Johnson 
voiced to Mrs. Johnson his desire to avoid any suffering as he neared his death. No one coerced, 
or even suggested, how he might avoid suffering in his final months. Furthermore, there is no 
evidence that Johnson was under the influence of drugs or alcohol when revoking his instructive 
directive. Although his act of revocation was extreme, it was consistent with desire to avoid any 
suffering. It was a rational decision. Thus, Johnson’s method of revocation was voluntary and 
implemented without coercion.  
Furthermore, the State’s interests do not outweigh Johnson’s right to chose to revoke his 
instructive directive by attempted suicide. First, the State’s interest in preserving life is not 
implicated. Johnson’s choice and method of revocation did not involve the actual or potential life 
of another. Rather, he was the only person affected by his decision. When the decision maker is 
the only person affected by the choice, “the state’s indirect and abstract interest in preserving the 
life of the competent patient. . .gives way to the patient’s much stronger personal interest in 
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directing the course of his own life.”171 Thus, the State’s interest in preserving life does not 
apply.  
Additionally, the state’s interest in preventing suicide creates no tension in this 
hypothetical. The Legislature explicitly phrased this interest as preventing “purposeful self-
destruction, motivated by a specific intent to die.”172 The language the Legislature used is telling. 
The State is concerned with preventing people from choosing to commit suicide if they are 
motivated by a specific intent to die. Here, Johnson was not motivated by a specific intent to die 
when he attempted suicide. He was motivated by a desire to avoid pain and suffering. True, 
Johnson’s method of revocation was extreme. However, his choice to revoke his instructive 
directive in an extreme or dangerous manner was protected by his fundamental right to make 
health care decisions.173        
 Similarly, the State’s interest in safeguarding the integrity of the medical profession is 
not implicated. Johnson’s doctor explained his prognosis and life expectancy to him when he 
was diagnosed with Stage IV lung cancer. Given that Johnson was competent at the time he was 
diagnosed, his doctor’s responsibilities did not extend beyond advising Johnson about his 
prognosis.174 After being fully advised, Johnson was free to make any personal health care 
decision, no matter how extreme. 
Moreover, innocent third parties were not affected by Johnson’s decision to revoke his 
instructive directive by attempted suicide. Mrs. Johnsons and their child are adults and capable of 
taking care of themselves. 
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Finally, Johnson is not in any of danger of abuse by allowing him to achieve revocation 
by attempted suicide. Johnson’s condition is terminal. His life expectancy is four-six months. 
Further, his suicide attempted caused incapacitation. But for Johnson’s instructive directive, Mrs. 
Johnson – as his health care representative – would be allowed to withhold his life-sustaining 
medical treatment because Johnson’s cancer constitutes a terminal condition.175 Allowing Mrs. 
Johnson to withhold life-sustaining medical treatment would be consistent with Johnson’s 
rational choice to attempt suicide, motivated by an intent to avoid suffering. It would not 
constitute abuse.176 Thus, Johnson is not in any danger of abuse by allowing him to revoke his 
instructive directive by attempted suicide. 
However, in the instant hypothetical, it would be impossible for two non-attending 
physicians to confirm whether Johnson was competent when revoking his instructive directive by 
attempted suicide because his revocatory act left him incompetent. Johnson’s suicide attempt 
caused severe mental and physical damage, resulting in the need for life-sustaining medical 
treatment.  
When a competent declarant’s method of revocation causes incompetency, a court should 
employ one of the three substitute decision-making tests established in Conroy to determine if 
revocation of the declarant’s advance directive is consistent with his wishes or best interests. 
Thus, depending on the types of evidence available, a court should first apply the substitute 
judgment test.177 If not enough trustworthy evidence exists to satisfy the substitute judgment test, 
                                                 
175 N.J.S.A. 26:2H-67(a)(3). 
176 N.J.S.A. 26:2H-77(a). 
177 Conroy, 98 N.J. at 360-1. 
 28 
a court should apply the limited-objective test.178 If no evidence exists as to the declarant’s 
intent, a court should apply the pure-objective test.179  
The substitute judgment test requires the health care representative to determine what the 
particular incompetent declarant would have done under the same circumstances if he were 
competent.180 The limited-objective test requires the healthcare representative to balance the 
burdens of the patient’s continued life with treatment against the benefits of that life.181 The 
pure-objective test requires the healthcare representative to weigh the net burdens of the patient’s 
life with treatment against the benefits.182 
Replacing the “two non-attending physicians” requirement with an analysis pursuant to 
one of the applicable substitute decision-making tests is appropriate because it maintains the 
Farrell Court’s goal of protecting patients and their right to self-determination.183 In fact, the 
Farrell Court adopted the “two non-attending physicians” requirement “to preclude the need for 
court action to establish competency of the patient.”184 Here, given that the patient’s 
incompetency may necessitate judicial review, an analysis of their subjective wishes or best 
interests would properly protect an incompetent declarant who, while competent, revoked an 
instructive directive by extreme measures.185       
Johnson’s intent to revoke is most aptly corroborated under the substitute judgment test. 
Johnson sought to avoid any pain and suffer through death. His choice entirely contradicts the 
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terms of his instructive directive requesting life-sustaining medical treatment. Thus, Johnson’s 
instructive directive does not reflect his current wishes. 
Furthermore, Johnson’s instructive directive is outdated. It was created thirty years ago, 
when Johnson wanted to receive life-sustaining treatment in the event of incapacitation in hope 
of regaining his ability to care for his child. However, Johnson’s child is now an adult and 
capable of caring for himself. Therefore, the purpose with which he created his instructive 
directive is too remote and inconsistent with his current situation to reflect his current end of life 
wishes.  
Additionally, Johnson specifically told his wife that he did not want to suffer as his death 
drew near. This fear of suffering is both mature and rational. Given the fear’s rationality, it is 
clear that Johnson would not want his outdated advance directive to serve as an obstacle in 
avoiding that fear.  
Moreover, the medical evidence is particularly important in this case. Johnson was 
diagnosed with Stage IV lung cancer. He was only given four-six months to life. Johnson’s 
suicide attempt caused severe mental and physical damage, and he now being kept alive via life 
sustaining medical treatment. He is experiencing the very pain and suffering he sought to avoid 
by attempting suicide. Therefore, pursuant to the substitute judgment standard, it is clear that 
Johnson intended to revoke his instructive directive requesting life-sustaining medical treatment. 
His instructive directive should be considered revoked, thereby allowing Mrs. Johnson to 
terminate life-sustaining medical treatment.    
VII. Recommendations to the Legislature to avoid having the Judiciary address this 
issue.   
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Courts routinely state that issues involving a person’s right to make health care decisions 
are more properly addressed in the Legislature.186 In the Legislature, “fact finding can be less 
confined and the view points of all interested institutions and disciplines can be presented and 
synthesized.”187 As such, below are recommendations to the Legislature to keep this issue from 
judicial review. 
 No one can gainsay the Legislature’s interest in preserving life or preventing suicide.188 
Moreover, few, if any, would oppose a statutory provision prohibiting a suicide attempt from 
constituting an act evidencing intent to revoke. Oregon adopted one such provision, which states 
“[i]n making a health care decision, a health care representative may not consider an attempted 
suicide by the principal as any indication of the principal’s wishes with regard to health care.”189 
By enacting a similar provision, the Legislature would obviate the need the for courts to conduct 
a complicated analysis aimed at balancing the declarant’s fundamental right to make health care 
decisions with the State’s potentially countervailing interests.190  
 Additionally, the Legislature could adopt an alternative statutory scheme for the 
revocation provisions of the Act. There are three major statutory frameworks that states have 
adopted to govern revocation of advance directives, including the Majority Approach, the Third 
Party Approach, and the Principal-Only Approach.191 The Majority Approach allows a patient to 
revoke an advance directive “‘at any time and in any manner by the declarant’ or ‘at any time 
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and in any manner that communicates an intent to revoke.’” 192 “This is the broadest type of 
language and allows a wide range of actions by a patient to validly revoke or modify an advance 
directive.”193 
The Third Party Approach and the Principal-Only Approach generally allow advance 
directives to be revoked “orally or in writing or by some physical act that manifests an intention 
to revoke the document, such as ‘being canceled, defaced, obliterated, burned, torn, or otherwise 
destroyed.’”194 These two approaches differ in one major way. Under the Third Party Approach, 
a third party may effectuate the revocation of the advance directive;195 whereas under the 
Principal-Only Approach, only the declarant can effect the revocation.196 Moreover, a majority 
of the states that follow the Third-Party approach require the third party who is revoking the 
advance directive on behalf of the declarant to be in the presence of the declarant.197  
New Jersey follows the Majority Approach.198 That is why Johnson’s attempted suicide 
constitutes an act evidencing an intent to revoke his instructive directive. In order to prevent the 
instant conflict under the Act’s revocation provision, the Legislature should adopt the Third-
Party Approach. A suicide or a suicide attempt is not physical act that actually destroys the 
advance directive. Thus, adopting the Third-Party Approach would prevent one from ever 
achieving revocation of an advance directive by attempted suicide.  
Moreover, the Third-Party Approach is similar to New Jersey’s provision regarding 
revocation of wills. “A will. . .is revoked. . .by the performance of a revocatory act on the will, if 
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the testator performed the act with the intent and for the purpose of revoking the will.”199 A 
“‘revocatory act on the will’ includes burning, tearing, canceling, obliterating or destroying the 
will of any part of it.”200 If the Legislature adopted the Third-Party Approach with regard to the 
revocation of advance directives, it would provide congruity in the law. Wills and advance 
directives – which are both end-of-life documents – would only be revocable by the same 
physical acts. Finally, the Third-Party Approach is better than the Principal-Only Approach 
because the Principal-Only Approach is too restrictive.201 Therefore, these legislative changes 
would help keep the instant issue from judicial review.   
VIII. Conclusion. 
 
In conclusion, a terminally ill declarant’s suicide attempt can constitute an act evidencing 
an intent to revoke an instructive directive requesting life-sustaining treatment.  
                                                 
199 N.J.S.A. 3B:3-13(b). 
200 Id. 
201 Peter C. Harman, Note, ‘Locked-In’ to Their Decisions: Investigating How the States Govern 
Revocation of Advance Directives and How Three States Make Revocation Impossible for People 
with Locked-In Syndrome, 3 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 193, 212 (2011). 
